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THE MOST-FAVOURED NATION PRINCIPLE,
EQUAL PROTECTION, AND MIGRATION POLICY
TOMER BROUDE*
1.

INTRODUCTION

This short article discusses the theoretical interaction between the economically grounded most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment principle1 and the
human-rights based concept of equal protection of migrants. In the multilateral law of international trade,2 MFN is an article of faith that lays a valid
claim to having significantly contributed to the success of the tradeliberalizing and welfare-enhancing role of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade / World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO).3 Above and beyond its
trade-related economic roles, when it applies to individuals of different
nationalities, the logic of MFN also appears to generally conform to fundamental principles of equal protection of the law and non-discrimination under
general human rights law.4 Since most international migration is economic in
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Director Minerva Center for Human Rights, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; BA, LLB, Hebrew
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for helpful comments. © 2010, Tomer Broude.
1. Stated generally, “An MFN clause is a provision in a treaty under which a State agrees to
accord to the other contracting partner treatment that is no less favourable than that which it accords
to other or third States.” See Int’l Law Comm’n [ILC], 59th session, Report of the Working Group:
Most-Favoured-Nation Clause, Annex, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.719 (July 20, 2007), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_l719.pdf.
2. As specified in Article I GATT and emulated in several other provisions in the WTO
Agreements. See, e.g., General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), art. II, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 31, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994); Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 31, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994). For background and analysis see William J. Davey & Joost Pauwelyn, MFN Unconditionality: A Legal Analysis of the Concept in View of Its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with
Particular Reference to the Issue of Like Product, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW, 13 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., Univ. of
Mich. Press 2000).
3. See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of the Most Favored Nation Clause,
in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 43
(Jagdeep S. Bhandani & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997) (distinguishing between the normative and
positive roles of MFN); KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM, 71-94 (2002).
4. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating that the rights and freedoms of the UDHR
apply to everyone without distinction of any kind, including national origin). For a brief discussion of
other sources, see section 3 infra.
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nature,5 and at the same time raises significant issues of human rights and
global justice,6 would it not logically follow that migration policy should be
subject to an MFN-type rule of non-discrimination? Such an MFN rule
would require migration-receiving states to apply their immigration laws on
equal terms towards all immigration, regardless of its origin. An MFN rule of
this type does not generally apply today either to national migration policies
or to international normative frameworks of immigration regulation. Its
adoption should, however, be considered at least in theory, presenting an
important potential overlap of mutual reinforcement between economic law
and human rights law. Indeed, a recent path-breaking academic proposal for a
multilateral “General Agreement on Labor Migration” (GALM), includes the
following draft clause, clearly inspired by the MFN principle in Article I:1
GATT: “With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, except as
specifically provided in this Agreement, each Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to citizens of any other Member treatment no less
favorable than it accords to like citizens of any other country.”7
Deriving from an entirely different rationale, the draft of the academic
proposal for an International Migrants Bill of Rights (IMBR), debated in this
symposium issue of the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal,8 includes the
following text, clearly based upon the language of general international
human rights instruments:
All migrants are equal before the law and are entitled to the equal
protection of the law on the same basis as nationals of the State in which
they reside. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any grounds such as nationality, legal status, . . . national or
social origin . . . .9

5. Among migrants, the “vast majority . . . move in search of better economic opportunities”
while only 9.7% are considered ‘refugees.’” Int’l Org. for Migration [IOM], World Migration 2005:
Costs and Benefits of International Migration, at 379, 381 (2005).
6. See Tomer Broude, The WTO/GATS Mode 4, International Labour Migration Regimes and
Global Justice, in COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONTEXT: PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICAL THEORY (Roland Pierik & Wouter G. Werner eds., 2010) (providing an overview
combining the economic and human rights considerations).
7. See “Illustrative Draft General Agreement on Labor Migration,” Appendix A, in JOEL P.
TRACHTMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ECONOMIC MIGRATION: TOWARD THE FOURTH FREEDOM 351
(Upjohn, 2009) [hereinafter GALM], at Article 7.1. In the proposed GALM framework, states would
make specific commitments on immigration, structured in a number of possible ways, generally
related to the economic and labor capacity of the migrant (horizontally; by occupational title; by
occupational group; by skill level or wealth level). See Article 5 GALM.
8. The IMBR is a project undertaken by faculty and students from Georgetown University Law
Center, the Minerva Center for Human Rights at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the
American University in Cairo, researching gaps and needs in migrants rights for the purpose of
preparing a draft document with commentary to be presented to governments and international
organizations.
9. IMBR Network, International Migrants Bill of Rights, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 399 (2010)
[hereinafter IMBR]. The draft clause quoted here, Article 2(1), emphasizes the equal treatment of
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Both of these proposals make bold and positive statements on the desirability of applying MFN (or ’equal protection’) in migration policy, although the
precise scope and exact legal mechanics of such prospective application is
uncertain and highly contingent on their particular interpretation and overarching context(s).10 The GALM would generally impose equal treatment
towards immigrants at the pre-admission/entry stage (“at the border”),11
whereas the IMBR would generally impose equal treatment to immigrants
already present in a destination state or possibly a transition state.12 What is
clear, however, is that both principles of non-discrimination would reflect
negatively on any national or international legal measure that permits
differentiation between migrants of different national status. In this article, I
will discuss some of the policy problems that an application of MFN and
equal protection to migration policy should take account of, and raise some
questions on the relationship between an economic migration-MFN and a
rights-based principle of equal protection. Put relatively simply, the overarching question is this: To what extent should international law, as a normative
matter, mandate the equal treatment of migrants, not in comparison to
incumbents, but in relation with each other, i.e., with respect to migrants from
other countries?
This article treats this question as a mixed question of economics and
human rights. A definitive answer is not possible in the limited space of this
article. The article will only provide some preliminary thoughts in this
context, as follows. In the next section, I will examine the applicability of the
basic economic and political rationales of trade-MFN to migration. In section
three, I will raise some corollary human rights-based issues with respect to a
broad equal protection and non-discrimination rule in migration policy. Some

migrants in comparison to nationals of the host state, but it also suggests that migrants from different
national origins should not be accorded differential treatment among each other.
10. It should be emphasized that the concept of migration-MFN as raised in Trachtman’s GALM,
on one hand, and the concept of equal protection and non-discrimination in the IMBR, on the other
hand, are clearly very different from each other, in their goals, scope and potential application.
Indeed, there is no full overlap between them. However, they will be discussed here together because
of their similar promotion of equality among migrants, which makes them potential “multi-sourced
equivalent norms” in international law, in that they point in the same prescriptive direction. See
generally MULTI-SOURCED EQUIVALENT NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Tomer Broude & Yuval
Shany eds., forthcoming 2011).
11. But the GALM MFN would apply to all measures covered by the agreement, which are
“measures . . . affecting labor migration, including without limitation immigration,” see GALM,
supra note 7, art. 2, which may include “behind the border” measures. It would also require ‘national
treatment’ in “behind the border” measures, with respect to foreigners admitted under a state’s
specific commitments, see GALM, supra note 7, art. 11, and this treatment would generally be
extended on an MFN basis.
12. See IMBR, supra note 9, art. 1(1): “The term ‘migrant’ in this Declaration means a person
present within the territory of a State of which he or she is not a citizen or national.” Compare with
Articles 1(2) and 2(1) of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families, according to which the ICMW (including the equal
protection clauses of Articles 1(1), 18 and 25) applies to migrant workers during “the entire migration
process,” including preparation for migration and return to their state of origin. G.A. Res. 45/158 U.S.
Doc. A/Res/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990).
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general conclusions follow.
2. MFN AND EQUAL PROTECTION IN MIGRATION POLICY FROM AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE
From an economic perspective, the evaluation of MFN in migration policy
is guided by utilitarian considerations. Overall, the liberalization of migration is considered welfare-enhancing,13 and it has been suggested that a
migration-MFN rule could promote this liberalization, as it has in trade in
goods.14 Would a migration-MFN serve the same objectives as trade-MFN,
and as effectively?
In international trade law, MFN serves at least two purposes; one is purely
economic, the other relates to political economy. First, the equal treatment of
imports of different origin—of goods, or services—is expected to prevent the
welfare-reducing effects of ’trade diversion’. Trade diversion occurs when
differential treatment of goods from different sources discriminates against
goods from more efficient exporters and in favor of less efficient ones.15 In
other words, discrimination between exporting markets may diminish, or
even erase, the welfare benefits of more open trade exchanges, whereas MFN
‘levels the playing field’, ensuring the proper functioning of market forces
between foreign competitors.
Second, MFN is expected to facilitate the reduction of barriers to international trade by encouraging states to make trade concessions. MFN ensures
that market access concessions received through reciprocal negotiations are
not bypassed or eroded by subsequent agreements with competing markets.
This is presumed to increase the willingness of politicians to make trade
concessions.16
Moreover, in trade, MFN can create the so-called ‘free rider’ problem,
because states that did not contribute to liberalization by making market
access concessions in a particular sector will nonetheless benefit from the
MFN level of concessions granted to those states who did. This problem,
however, is mitigated in the multilateral context, in which the reciprocal
negotiation process generally ensures that all states contribute to overall
liberalization. As a result, MFN amplifies the liberalizing effect of market
access concessions by extending them to all potential beneficiaries.
Are these considerations valid with respect to migration policy? Applying
the economic logic of international trade regulation to migration, an analogy

13. See Jonathon W. Moses & Bjørn Letnes, The Economic Costs to International Labor
Restrictions: Revisiting the Empirical Discussion, 32 World Dev. 10, 1610 (2004).
14. See Trachtman, supra note 7, at 281-284.
15. “Trade diversion” as a term of art in international economics was first developed by Jacob
Viner. Jacob Viner, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (New York: Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace
1950).
16. See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 3, at 46 (explaining that MFN does not only constrain trade
discrimination but shapes the bargaining process in the WTO).
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is drawn between the price of foreign goods and the labor cost of migrants.
Hence, one can argue that “individuals willing to work at the lowest price (all
other things being equal) should migrate,”17 and migration-MFN would
clearly facilitate this by enabling international cost comparisons. It must be
noted, however, that this approach somewhat understates the complexity of
the economic factors that drive migration. Trade diversion is a problem in
aggregate welfare terms primarily when it distorts comparative advantage,
rather than absolute advantage (as reflected by the lowest price). Yet it is
sometimes posited that migration flows are based on absolute advantage, not
comparative advantage.18 The idea that laborers whose work is nominally
cheaper should migrate conforms to this. However, the cheapest global
source of labor might not be the most efficient one, just as the cheapest goods
might not be the most efficiently produced ones. Comparative advantage is
based on opportunity costs, not absolute costs. In terms of welfare maximization, those who should migrate are not those whose labor is cheapest, but
rather those for whom the opportunity cost of migration is lowest. But what is
the opportunity cost of migration? How does the comparative advantage that
exists when there is little labor mobility relate to the comparative advantage
of labor migrants under conditions of labor mobility liberalization? Clearly,
these are labor/migration economics issues that must be further investigated.
Nevertheless, at this level of abstraction, MFN at entry would seem to be
the most efficient general rule. If migration is guided by comparative
advantage, this is surely the case. If, however, it is guided by absolute
advantage, it would still be the most efficient rule insofar as a systemic
divergence of absolute advantage from comparative advantage is not identified. Thus, an economic perspective would support a general rule of migrationMFN, both at the national and international levels of regulation. There are,
however, at least two economic complications to this conclusion.
First, migrants, as opposed to consumable goods, have to face the costs
and conditions of living in destination countries. These costs are in part
determined by measures applied “behind the border,” such as healthcare,
education and social security coverage. If such measures are extended to
migrants from different sources on a discriminatory basis, the purposes
served by MFN at entry might be undermined. Thus, from an economic
perspective, it would appear that applying MFN at entry would not be
sufficient to achieve efficient migration if it were not supported by MFN
‘behind the border,’ i.e., equal treatment of migrants among themselves after
admission. This is something that the IMBR equal protection clause can
provide, making it complementary to an economic MFN principle.
Second, and this is a crucial caveat, a national treatment principle applied
‘behind the border,’ granting immigrants rights equal to those of residents of

17.
18.

Trachtman, supra note 7, at 282.
Id. at 45.
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the receiving state, can quite simply cancel out or at least distort the
economic benefits of MFN ‘at the border.’ So far we have considered
migration’s efficiencies as based on the relative cost of labor, whose effects
are preserved by MFN treatment ‘at the border.’ However, a nondiscrimination rule of a national treatment nature, such as one that requires
all immigrants to be paid a minimum or equal wage at destination state
levels, or receive social benefits that are equal to those of incumbents, could
erase the advantages of lower-cost migrant labor, viewed not only from the
supply side, but also in aggregate welfare terms. Employers in the destination
state will be indifferent to the migrants’ origin because they would all have to
be compensated at the same level (assuming, as is likely, that minimum
wages apply). Whether economic migration is guided by absolute or comparative advantage, this could wipe out economic differences between migrants
from different source countries, and opportunities for migration, or rather,
efficient migration, would be reduced. Paradoxically, then, national treatment
can revive the ’migration diversion’ avoided by MFN by reducing gaps
between the absolute costs or opportunity costs of migrants from different
sources.19
Consequently, while the economic logic of MFN appears to generally hold
with respect to immigration, important caveats apply. Most importantly, a
policy conflict can emerge between two rules of non-discrimination that
might otherwise have been considered complementary: MFN and national
treatment. This would occur whether national treatment were achieved
through an economic migration regime like the GALM, or through a
rights-based instrument like the IMBR (or the International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families). This
does not mean, in itself, that a national treatment rule is not morally or
otherwise justifiable, but only that the relationship between the applicable
scope of MFN and national treatment within ideals of equal protection
among immigrants must be carefully considered.
Moving on to the political economy aspect of MFN—the encouragement
of liberalizing concessions—this appears prima facie to be irrelevant in the
migration context, with some qualifications. While all states are concerned
with export promotion and competitiveness in goods and services, and do not
wish to see their market access conditions undercut by others, few are
concerned with the competitiveness of their emigrants in the same way. In
fact, for some labor-exporting states, non-discrimination rules that deter
migration might actually reduce their absolute advantages and hence their
‘market share’ of migration. In other cases, MFN might increase emigration
19. A distinction may be drawn, in this respect, between discrimination that deters immigration
(such as a tax on migrant labor), and discrimination that encourages it (such as a rule whereby
migrants may be remunerated at home state levels). See Tomer Broude, A Minimal Liberal Defense of
(Some) Discrimination in Migration Regulation, Hebrew U. Int’l Law Res. Paper No. 24-09,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id⫽1513530.
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in high-skilled sectors, heightening concerns of brain drain. Trachtman is
correct that “citizens hoping to migrate may criticize their governments for
failing to obtain equal treatment with other home states,”20 but it is less than
clear why such criticism should mobilize governmental action, since those
who wish to migrate would generally be a lost political constituency, as a
matter of public policy, even if their particular interests were served.
On the migration-receiving side, experience shows that states have an
aversion against unconditional MFN commitments in migration;21 this is not
just a question of preserving particular communitarian preferences based,
inter alia, on language or common backgrounds, but an apparent overall
objection to constraining the flexibility of national immigration policy
through standards of MFN at the threshold of entry or admission. The
asymmetrical nature of migration flows22 means that receiving states have
little to gain, and sending states little to offer, in terms of reciprocal
concessions on access to labor markets, that might have benefited from MFN
under reciprocity.
In sum, the transfer of the economic and political rationales of MFN from
trade in goods to migration is not a smooth one. MFN at entry, as well as
rights-based equal protection, make economic sense, but only as part of a
broader regulatory scheme that would relate to potentially discordant economic effects of unequal treatment among immigrants after entry, and the
concept of national treatment, whether rights-based or derived from economic principles.
3. THE SCOPE OF MFN AND EQUAL PROTECTION FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVE
The above discussion has generally likened an economic migration-MFN
(as in the GALM) to rights-based principles of equal protection and nondiscrimination (as in the IMBR). We have even seen that the rights-based
approach may serve as a complement or even as a substitute for an economic
principle (as far as post-admission, “behind the border” MFN treatment is
concerned). However, it should be clear that the economic MFN principle
under discussion, and the rights-based principle of non-discrimination,
would be guided by very different goals, and might therefore also operate
differently. An economic migration-MFN would be concerned chiefly with
eliminating those instances of discrimination between migrants that have an
impact on the competitive conditions of labor migration. In contrast, the

20. Trachtman, supra note 7, at 282.
21. See Marion L. Panizzon, Bilateral Migration Agreements and the GATS: Sharing Responsibility Versus Reciprocity, 5 J. MIGRATION & REFUGEE ISSUES 70, 71 (2009).
22. See Timothy J. Hatton, Should We Have a WTO for International Migration?, 22 ECON. POL’Y
339, 359 (2007) (explaining that international migration is strongly characterized by asymmetry
between developed, migration-receiving countries, and developing, migration-sending countries).
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principle of equal protection and non-discrimination is concerned with
eradicating differential treatment of migrants that violates their human right
to equality. These concepts will not necessarily overlap; the first is utilitarian,
the second is deontological (even though it has an impact on utility). At
times, the economic protection will be broader and more effective than the
rights-based one, and at other times the opposite may be the case.
For example, the economic MFN might frown upon an immigration
system that applies different visa formalities towards prospective migrants
from different states, because it might technically impede immigration from
economically efficient sources. Yet the same differential treatment might not
constitute a significant problem, if any, from a human rights perspective.23
Conversely, to give an extreme example, economic MFN might not see
anything fundamentally wrong with a national law enforcement policy that
applies strictly toward immigrants of a particular racial background, so long
as it does not distort competition in the labor market. A rights-based rule
would, however, see it as a severe problem.24 Furthermore, we have noted
that governments in immigration-receiving states may have political and
economic motivations to avoid making a migration-MFN commitment, as
many of them have done in trade in goods. These may also constitute reasons
for governments to refrain from making effective yet broad commitments on
equal protection and non-discrimination in the area of migrant rights.25
The question therefore arises, what would/should the scope of a migrationMFN principle or equal protection rule be from a human rights perspective?
This is first and foremost a question of human rights, although it interacts
with economic and political interests. It may be broken up into two stages:
pre-entry and post-entry.
During pre-entry, the question is whether, and to what degree, would a
rights-based equal protection and non-discrimination rule (as between migrants of different sources) constrain the capacity of governments to make
policy distinctions based on migrants’ origin in their immigration admission
policies? If, for example, a state passes a law that restricts immigration from
origins that can be characterized on an ethnic basis, or on the basis of
religion, would it be acceptable from a human rights perspective? Notably,

23. In fact, immigration procedures may be used not to further economic regulatory goals, but
rather to discriminate against certain groups of immigrants on a racial basis. See Virginie Giraudon,
Moroccan Immigration in France: Do Migration policies Matter?, 6 J. IMMIGR. & REFUGEE STUD. 366
(2008); Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Racial profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH.
U. L. Q. 675 (2000).
24. However, such discriminatory treatment may have distinct economic effects, such as when
race-based enforcement impacts on the ability of migrants to work. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson,
Driver’s Licenses and Undocumented Immigrants: The Future of Civil Rights Law?, 5 NEV. L.J. 213
(2004).
25. And indeed, just as developed states have avoided making commitments in the WTO’s GATS
Mode 4, that would apply on an MFN basis, they have avoided adopting the rights-based ICMW—no
industrialized states have adopted it to date—that includes relatively strong non-discrimination
language.
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the IMBR and its commentary do not make a definitive statement in this
respect. To begin with, the definition of “Migrant” in Article 1 IMBR
excludes prospective immigrants still present in their home state. This means
that a national immigration measure that excluded or reduced immigration
from states of a particular predominant ethnicity or religion might not even
be regulated by the IMBR. If the IMBR seeks to achieve equal treatment in
admission on a human rights basis, why should it be limited on such a
geographical basis? Furthermore, equality under IMBR Article 2(1) is
limited to equal “protection.” Admission as an immigrant provides much
more than “protection”; does Article 2(1) nevertheless apply to admission?
Article 2(2) provides a partial, unsatisfactory answer: Distinctions in the
regulation of admission are “permissible” pursuant to a “legitimate aim” with
an “objective justification,” and subject to “reasonable proportionality.” This
language is far too malleable; and in any case, how can the clause permit
what has not been expressly prohibited? The IMBR’s equal protection clause,
although heavily laden with the language of human rights, leaves us with
little policy guidance in this respect.
Somewhat counter-intuitively, an economic migration-MFN rule might
actually provide a clearer basis—and even a higher standard—of equal
treatment and non-discrimination at entry. The question of equality at
admission would shift from the vagueness of reasonableness and objectivity
to an economic standard of “likeness.” The GALM, for example, refers to
“like citizens.”26 While the “likeness” standard is not free of difficulty, to say
the least, even when it applies to goods27 or services,28 in the immigration
context, arbitrary racial or denominational distinctions between prospective
immigrants would be difficult to justify as a matter of economic law, rather
than human rights law.
After entry, a different question arises. Would it be legitimate for a state to
grant immigrants from one source a better set of rights than it grants
immigrants from another source? For example, a receiving state might grant
immigrants from one sending state full social security rights, but refuse those
same rights to immigrants from another sending state. It might wish to do so
unilaterally, to encourage immigration from a particular source, or to improve the conditions of a segment of its immigrant population; or it might do
so as an obligation in a bilateral or regional immigration agreement. Such
discrimination might not be precluded under an economic arrangement like

26. Art. 7.1 GALM, Trachtman, supra note 7.
27. The “likeness” of products is one of the most intractable of issues in international trade. See
generally WON-MOG CHOI, ‘LIKE PRODUCTS’ IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: TOWARDS A CONSISTENT
GATT/WTO JURISPRUDENCE (2003).
28. See Joost Pauwelyn, Comment: The Unbearable Lightness of Likeness, in GATS AND THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 358 (Marion Panizzon, Nicole Pohl & Pierre
Sauvé eds., 2008).
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the GALM, especially if it were covered by an accepted exception to MFN.29
Under the IMBR, however, the acceptability of such discrimination is
doubtful. An expansive reading of IMBR Article 2 would have it cover all
legal rights. A restricted reading would limit non-discrimination to the core
concept of “equal protection,” that is, to the effective access to and shielding
of the rule of law. In between, “equal protection” might apply only to
enumerated rights specifically covered by international human rights instruments and guarantee their respect only to their minimal recognized degree.
The IMBR Commentary follows the expansive reading. It refers to the
limiting terms “actual and effective protection of law,” but then broadly
states that “legislation itself should not be discriminatory,” citing General
Comment 18 of the UN Human Rights Committee.30 This General Comment,
although clearly of immediate relevance to civil and political rights, argues
that the right to equality enshrined in Article 26 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and echoed by IMBR Article 2, is an
“autonomous right” that “prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any
field regulated and protected by public authorities.”31 This suggests that
equality is a virtually absolute principle that applies to all legal rights.
However, in the international law of economic, social and cultural rights—
the realm in which policy-driven discrimination between immigrants of
different sources would be most prevalent—it is recognized that nondiscrimination, as an obligation, is contingent on the existence of enumerated
substantive rights and should not be understood as “an autonomous right to
be free from discrimination.”32 The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) itself lacks an equivalent to ICCPR
Article 26, and its own equal protection clause (ICESCR Article 2, which is
similar in its specificity to ICCPR Article 233) refers only to equality in the
“rights enunciated” in the ICESCR. The IMBR commentary may therefore
be too definite and overly expansive in its application of the right to equality,
both in relation to other human rights instruments and to the need for
flexibility in economic migration policy.
The policy implications are significant. A strict, rights-based requirement
of equality in economic and social rights could deprive states of important
tools for the regulation of migration at the state and international levels,
including steps aimed at encouraging migration that may have important
effects on development and poverty reduction in the least privileged states in

29. See, e.g., Art. 8 GALM.
30. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, Non-discrimination (Thirty-seventh
session, 1989), Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 146 (2003).
31. Id. para. 12.
32. See MARIA M. SEPÚLVEDA CARMONA, THE NATURE OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 380 (2003).
33. ICCPR Article 2 refers to “rights recognized” in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
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the international system. This would be an unnecessary expression of what
has been called the liberal immigration paradox: Liberal constituencies in
rich countries might be open to immigration from poor countries, but they are
also wedded to the idea of egalitarianism; yet, setting the standard of (local)
equality too high means that migration is precluded, and global inequality
perpetuated.34 The immigration paradox would seem to apply to equality
between different sources of immigration as well as to equality between
immigrants and incumbents: Formal equality (albeit much qualified, so long
as borders are not truly open) might be considered more important than the
encouragement of welfare-enhancing migration.
4.

CONCLUSIONS

The discriminatory treatment of immigrants can be repugnant; there is no
question of that. With respect to such inequalities, the IMBR’s equal
protection clause, if adopted by states as either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ law, would no
doubt bolster existing international human rights law and migration law.
What would remain unclear in both legal and policy terms is the extent to
which equal treatment between immigrants of different sources should be
pursued with respect to rights that dovetail with legitimate economic and
social policy measures. The above discussion has shown that there are
distinct interactions between human rights in migration, on one hand, and
economic regulation of migration, on the other hand. While this article has
not provided any definite answers to these questions, it has at least demonstrated how international economic and regulatory disciplines are intertwined
with human rights principles. In this field, as in other areas, an economic
approach (e.g., a migration-MFN rule) may at times complement, and be
complemented by, a rights-based approach (i.e. an “equal protection” clause).
On the merits, we have seen how these interactions can expose a central
problem in migration policy, namely, the tension between global equality and
local equality. Strict requirements of equality can impact the willingness of
states and constituencies to allow immigration, which in turn can reduce
global inequities. Equal protection and economic migration-MFN should not
be drafted too sweepingly, lest they throw the baby of migration liberalization out with the bathwater of protecting vulnerable migrants from abusive
discrimination.

34. See Howard F. Chang, The Immigration Paradox: Poverty, Distributive Justice, and Liberal
Egalitarianism, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 759 (2003).

